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Once formulated, such norms might tentatively govern our environmental behavior. Ecology will never be a science more exact than medicine. So we should always be prepared to change our notions of what is good for nature, just as we are prepared to change our notions of what is good for our bodies. But again, environmental philosophy should not concern itself with formulating and reformulating specific norms of environmental health and integrity. That is a job for ecologists. We philosophers should busy ourselves, rather, with connecting ecological "facts" (Le., ecological hypotheses and theories) with values, and with trying to show, as I do in my book, that it is no less incumbent upon us to be solicitous of the health and integrity (however tentatively defmed) of (changing, evolving) biotic communities than of the health and integrity of (changing, aging) human persons and of (changing, developing) human societies. Can you make words-like "evolution," "community," and "norm,"-mean so many different things, claiming one meaning in one argument, and an incompatible meaning in another?
Biology and Ethics
In his "Reply," Professor Callicott states: "I nowhere suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous." Yet., as I quoted in my review, Callicott claims: The "conceptual and logical foundations of the land ethic" are a "Darwinian protosociobiological natural history of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of life on earth.... Its logic is that natural selection has endowed human beings with an affective moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and community membership and identity."2 Value "in the philosophical sense," says Callicott, "is a newly discovered proper object of a specially evolved "publick affection" or "moral sense" which all psychologically normal human beings have inherited from a long line of primates."3 It is logically inconsistent for Callicott to claim that evolution and natural selection provide the foundations of the land ethic, then, once someone points out the problematic logical consequences of this position, to deny espousing evolutionary ethics.
DISCUSSION
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Similar difficulties plague Callicou's conception of community, as I noted in my review. In his "Reply," Callicott claims: "if the concept of a human com munity is coherent and robust enough to support anthropocentric moral obligations...then the concept of a biotic community-since no less coherent and robust-is coherent and robust enough to support ecocentric moral obligations." His claim does not wode, however, because of the incompatible properties that Callicott aUributes to biotic and human communities. In Callicott's book, he says that we humans "remain members of the human community," and that we have "moral responsibilities... to respect universal human rights."" Yet, Callicottalso claims: "Not only are other sentient creatures members of the biotic community and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and stability; so are we.,,5 Either certain universal human rights have primacy, or the biotic community has primacy. For both to have primacy is impossible. Or, as Alice phrased it, to the Queen: "One can't believe impossible things.'06 Finally, in his "Reply," Callicott denies my charge that his ethics is not normative by claiming that his ethics is normative in the sense in which a body temperature of 98.6 degrees "provides a norm against which we measure deviations-fever and hypothermia" That is, Callicott claims that his ethics (like a norm in medicine) is statistically nonnative. My review charged, however, that his ethics was not ethically normative. viz.:
one cannot be praised for acting in accord with natural selection. Either a certain ethical tendency is selected for, or it is not. This means that behavioral uniformities that are explained through natural selection are descriptive, nOI normative. Hence Callicott has admittedly saved his ethics from relativism, but at the price of its "oughtness" or normative character.
Callicott cannot answer the charge ofhis denying ethical norms by responding that his ethics has statistical norms.
Statistical norms always tell us what behavior is most probable or frquenl, in the sense of statistical frequency.
Ethical norms do nol
Where does this exchange leave us? At the least, with some agreement. As Callicott correctly put it in his "Reply,": "ecology does not provide us with objective dynamic norms of ecosystemic health." Further, our exchange suggests that, just as scientific
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progress comes from a plurality of theories, so also progress in environmental ethics likely will come fron a plurality of philosophical approaches-such as Callicott's work, rooted in a profound grasp of moral theory, and my own work, grounded in biology and philosophy of science. My recommendation for the future is that we take the advice of Ernst Mayr and analyze the key concepts of environmental ethics, concepts like "evolution," "community" and "norm," as Callicott and I have done. Mayr said that the "spectacular recent progress" in evolutionary theory was
